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RESERVATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Treaties underpin much of modem international relations. Reservations
play an important role with regard to multilateral treaties. In many instances,
the ability to formulate reservations makes it possible for a state to decide to
become party to a treaty while reserving its position with regard to a provision
of the treaty with which it has difficulties.' This possibility might enable a
state to overcome certain constraints, in particular, domestic legal and political
considerations, which may inhibit its ability to become a party to a multilateral
treaty.2 Although, in this sense, reservations contribute to encouraging wider
participation in many multilateral treaties, it is legitimate to ask whether such
wider participation alone assists in advancing the essential goals of such
treaties. This question becomes particularly pertinent as many contemporary
treaties are negotiated with meticulous care in order to accommodate the often
differing interests of individual states and groups of states. Various conces-
sions are made and compromises are reached during these negotiating
processes in order to achieve the broadest possible agreement. In these
circumstances, the use of reservations by some countries could contribute to
further diluting the scope of the treaties concerned. It is the experience of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (Secretary-General) that certain
multilateral treaties have tended to attract more reservations than others.
The Secretary-General, as the largest depositary of multilateral treaties, has
played a significant role in contributing to the development of the law and
practice relating to reservations since 1945. This Article will essentially focus
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 107 (2000).
2 MICHAEL AKEHURST, MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Peter
Malanczuk ed., 7th rev. ed. 1997); D.W. Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral
Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67, 76-77 (1976-77); see also SaABTAI ROSENNE, THE
PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 373 (2002).
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on the developments in his practice since 1969 with regard to reservations. 3
It will not deal with all aspects of the practice of the Secretary-General as
depositary of multilateral treaties.4
]I. BACKGROUND
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) substantially
codified the law relating to the functions of depositaries.5 Consequently, the
VCLT has provided the legal framework for the Secretary-General of the
United Nations in his role as the depositary of multilateral treaties.6 Most
aspects of the law relating to reservations and declarations to treaties are also
codified in the VCLT.7
3 For the sake of consistency and convenience to readers and researchers, the approach
adopted in this Article roughly approximates the organization of the United Nations' Treaty
Handbook. See generally TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, TREATY
HANDBOOK, U.N. Sales No. E.02fV.2 (2001), http://untreaty.un.orgfEnglish/TreatyHandbook/
hbframeset.htm [hereinafter TREATY HANDBOOK]. Unless otherwise stated, the principles
discussed in this Article apply generally to reservations to multilateral treaties deposited with the
Secretary-General. However, note that the Secretary-General takes a special approach with
regard to reservations to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261.
' For detailed information on the practice of the Secretary-General, see TREATY SECTION,
U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF PRACTICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS
DEPOSITARY OFMULTLATERALTREATIES, U.N. Doc. ST/LEGI7/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. 94.V. 15
(1994), http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Sunmary.asp [hereinafter SUMMARY OF PRACTICE].
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT] (stating "the codification and progressive development of the law of treaties achieved
in the present Convention will promote the purposes of the United Nations set for the Charter,"
while "[a]ffirming that the rules of customary international law will continue to govern questions
not regulated by [the VCLT]."
6 See, e.g., id. pt. VII (Depositaries, Notifications, Corrections and Registration), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 350-52.
7 See id. pt. II, § 2 (Reservations), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-38. The rules relating to
reservations, which initially developed through customary international law, continue to be
fostered through state practice and the practice of the depositaries. See, e.g., Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, openedfor signature Aug. 23, 1978, art. 20, 1946
U.N.T.S. 3, 13-14 (providing procedures with respect to reservations for newly independent
states succeeding to multilateral treaties); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between
States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986,
§ 2 (Reservations), 25 I.L.M. 543, 556-59 (applying the VCLT's reservation provisions to the




With over 500 multilateral treaties in his custody, the Secretary-General is,
by far, the largest depositary in the world,8 and the treaties in his charge cover
almost every aspect of international interaction. They range across the
spectrum of human activity, covering sustainable development, the oceans,
human rights, humanitarian affairs, terrorism, international criminal matters,
refugees and stateless persons, disarmament, commodities, narcotics,
organized crime, transport, communications, as well as outer space.9 The
number of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General continues to grow at
an average of twelve new multilateral treaties every year, while some treaties
may be terminated or superseded.'"
Generally, the Secretary-General's tendency is to adopt a cautious and
conservative approach in the discharge of his responsibilities as depositary.
However, he has had to adjust his practice to accommodate the complexities
of the various multilateral treaties deposited with him, their special characteris-
tics, as well as the evolving needs of the international community, which has
grown considerably over the years.11 Consequently, certain developments in
his role as depositary have occurred in ways seemingly inconsistent with the
provisions of the VCLT.12 The practice of the Secretary-General has also had
an influence on other depositaries who have, on a number of matters, tended
to be guided by the precedents that he sets. 3 Accordingly, his practice has
been an important factor in the development of the law and practice relating
to reservations. The Secretary-General's practice as depositary is recorded in
the Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilat-
8 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, Foreword.
9 See, e.g., United Nations Multilateral Treaties, http://untreaty.un.org/Englishlbible/titles/
english.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2005) (providing the status of the multilateral treaties deposited
with the Secretary-General).
'0 Other than in exceptional circumstances, the Secretary-General only accepts in deposit
treaties which:
- have been adopted by the General Assembly;
- have been concluded by a conference convened by a UN organ;
- have been drawn up within the framework of a regional commission;
- are open multilateral treaties of a universal nature.
See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 28.
" In 1945, the United Nations had fifty-one members. Growth in United Nations
Membership, 1945-2005, http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
The UN currently has 191 members. Id.
12 See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 13.
'3 For example, the International Maritime Organisation follows the practice of the
Secretary-General with regard to terminology where there is a disagreement on the appropriate
terminology to identify countries.
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eral Treaties. 14
Early in the development of the Secretary-General's role as depositary of
multilateral treaties, 5 reservations were the subject of an advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice (I0) 6 which highlighted the importance of
the Secretary-General's practice. In 1950, in order to obtain guidance on the
question of the effect of reservations on the entry into force of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention), 7 the General Assembly of the United Nations (General
Assembly) requested, by resolution, an advisory opinion from the ICJ. 8 The
resulting advisory opinion gave rise to a General Assembly resolution which
required the Secretary-General to conform his practice (in the case of the
Genocide Convention and conventions concluded after the adoption of
Resolution 598(VI)) to the following: accept deposit instruments containing
reservations or objections; refrain from making a determination on the legal
effect of such instruments; and communicate such instruments to all states
concerned, leaving each state to draw the appropriate legal consequences.' 9 In
a second resolution in 1959, the General Assembly required the Secretary-
General to follow this practice with regard to all conventions concluded under
the auspices of the United Nations which did not contain provisions to the
contrary.2" Since then, the practice of the Secretary-General has reflected the
4 See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, IT 9-37 (providing the general aspects of the
depositary's functions). Subsequent developments in the Secretary-General's practice will be
reflected in future revisions of the Summary of Practice. See also Alain Pellet, Second Report
on Reservations to Treaties, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/478/Rev. 1 (1999) (providing a non-
exhaustive bibliography on the subject of reservations).
"S In 1950, the Secretary-General encountered a difficulty: whether the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which contains no provisions relating to
reservations, would enter into force, since a large number of the instruments of ratification
contained reservations to various provisions of the Convention. See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE,
supra note 4, 173; see also id. 168-172 (describing the Secretary-General's practice as
depositary with respect treaties silent as to reservation prior to 1952).
16 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
"7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
" G.A. Res. 478(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 305th plen. mtg. at 74, U.N. Doc. A/1494
(1950); see also SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 174.
'9 G.A. Res. 598(VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg. at 84, U.N. Doc. A/L.37
(1952); see also SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 1 176.
20 G.A. Res. 1452(XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 847th plen. mtg. at 56, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(1959); SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 177. For a brief discussion, see also AUST,
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approach adopted by the ICJ in its advisory opinion.2 1
The International Law Commission (ILC) has also addressed the issue of
reservations to treaties.22 Legal luminaries such as James Brierly, Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Sir Humphrey Waldock have all
reported to the ELC on reservations. The ILC's proposals provided the
substantial basis for the provisions on reservations incorporated in the VCLT,
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, and the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organisations or Between International Organisations.23
The ILC has continued to examine the subject of reservations. At its 45th
session in 1993, the ILC adopted a recommendation to include the topic "The
law and practice relating to reservations to treaties" on its agenda, subject to
the approval of the General Assembly. 4 The General Assembly approved this
recommendation at its 48th session in 1993, but required that the final form of
the work of the ILC be decided "after a preliminary study is presented to the
General Assembly."2 5 Professor Alain Pellet was appointed as the Special
Rapporteur for this study at the 46th session of the ILC in 1994.26 Signifi-
cantly, the ILC formed the conclusion that there should be no change to the
relevant provisions of the VCLT and the two related conventions, 27 and that
the results of the work of the Commission should take the form of guidelines
with commentaries.28 The Special Rapporteur has presented nine reports so
far.29 Reflecting current uncertainties in the international community with
regard to the law and practice relating to reservations and declarations to
supra note 1, at 129.
21 See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 1 188.
22 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. INT'LL.
COMM'N 123, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A11951/Add.1.
23 See generally Jos6 M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 REcUEILDES COURS 95 (1975).
24 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 438, U.N. DOC. A/49/10 (1994).
25 G.A. Res. A/RES/48/31, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 73d plen. mtg. at 328, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/31 (1993).
2' Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, supra
note 24, at 438.
27 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Seventh Session,
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 491, U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995).
28 Report on the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session,
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 10, IN 626-634, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000).
29 See Report of the International Law Commission of the Work of its Fifty-Sixty Session,
U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doe. A/59/10 (2004).
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treaties, states have expressed a diversity of views on some of the proposals.
The LLC has been progressively adopting draft guidelines on the basis of the
Special Rapporteur's reports.3 °
The work of the ILC is of special significance to the practice of the
Secretary-General. He tends to keep developments in the ILC under close
scrutiny due to the impact that they may have on his own practice. The views
expressed by the international community in response to the proposals made
by the Special Rapporteur have also been noted carefully by the Secretary-
General. The Special Rapporteur, for his part, has consulted states and
international organizations on their practices relating to reservations, and has
been provided a detailed briefing by the Treaty Section of the United Nations
Office of Legal Affairs on the practice of the Secretary-General.3
A. What Is a Reservation?
The Secretary-General's practice with regard to determining what
constitutes a reservation is consistent with the provisions of the VCLT.32 A
state may formulate a formal statement upon signature, ratification, accep-
tance, approval, confirmation of, or accession to a treaty33 with implications
for the legal rights and obligations under the treaty.34 Depending on the
objective of the state concerned, such a statement may be entitled a "reserva-
tion," "declaration," "understanding," "interpretative declaration," or
"interpretative statement."" "However phrased or named, any such statement
purporting to exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty provision with
31 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-First Session,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 470, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (1999).
3' Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, 103, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see G.A. Res. 156, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda Item 147, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/156 (1997).
32 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
"3 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.1.
34 A successor state, "the State which has replaced another State on the occurrence of a
succession of States," Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra
note 7, art. 2(1)(d), 1946 U.N.T.S. at 6, depositing an instrument of succession is treated as a
state undertaking a treaty action such as ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. See
generally id., art. 1, 1946 U.N.T.S. at 5; SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 289-29 1.
Accordingly, a successor state will be entitled to withdraw an existing reservation or lodge a new
instrument of reservation. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,
supra note 7, art. 20, 1946 U.N.T.S. at 13.
31 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.1.
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regard to the declarant is, in fact, a reservation. '36 The Secretary-General, as
the depositary, receives in deposit a large number of statements which are
categorized as "reservations," all of which are analyzed, faithfully recorded,
and circulated to the international community.37
In most cases, the intention of a state which formulates such a statement on
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession is clear. Such
statements are unequivocally intended to be reservations and raise little or no
difficulty for the depositary or for the other parties to the relevant treaties.3 s
However, in certain cases the real purpose of a statement being formulated on
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession becomes contentious
and these cases give rise to legal issues. Some of these statements have
resulted in considerable discussion and have contributed to the development
of the practice of the Secretary-General.39
36 Id.; see VCLT, supra note 5, art. 2(l)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333; see also Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fiftieth Session, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, 1 495-499, U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (1998). The Special Rapporteur proposed the
following definition:
Reservation means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made
by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally
confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty or by a State when
making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or
organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of a treaty in their application to that State or to that international
organization.
Id. at 176 n.177.
37 See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 311 (listing the types of depositary
notification the Secretary-General provides for interested parties); TREATY HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, § 3.5.5 (describing the Secretary-General's practice as depositary with respect to
depositary notifications of reservations in three cases: (1) where a treaty expressly prohibits
reservations, (2) where a treaty expressly authorizes reservations, and (3) where a treaty is silent
on reservations). Although in the past a depositary notifications of the Secretary-General could
have taken months to reach state capitals, now with the assistance of modem technology
depositary notifications are sent out the day on which they are processed by e-mail and are also
posted on the United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC) website, http://untreaty.un.org/English/
CTC/CTC.asp. Depositary notifications continue to be distributed in paper format also.
38 See, e.g., SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 189.
'9 For example, a state seeking to become party to a treaty may formulate a statement that
is tantamount to a reservation due to domestic political considerations, although it is not entitled
a reservation.
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B. Who Can Formulate a Reservation?
The Secretary-General follows a strict practice with regard to persons
competent to formulate reservations on behalf of their states. He recognizes
this competency only in the same authorities recognized under the VCLT as
being capable of undertaking treaty actions on behalf of their states (or persons
acting for the time being for one of these authorities or possessing full powers
issued for the purpose).' ° The Secretary-General has taken the view that a
reservation, being a modification or exclusion of the treaty obligations being
undertaken by a state, should be expressed by the same authority which
undertakes the treaty action on behalf of the state. Accordingly, he would not
accept in deposit an instrument purporting to be a reservation submitted under
the signature of a permanent representative of a state to the United Nations
unless he or she is in possession of full powers authorizing the formulation of
the reservation in question.4'
The Secretary-General permits a permanent representative to the United
Nations of a state to undertake treaty actions on behalf of his or her govern-
ment without specific full powers for the purpose, if he or she is in possession
of appropriate general full powers.42 For example, the permanent representa-
tives of China and the United Kingdom carry general full powers that allow
them to undertake certain treaty actions on behalf of their governments without
specific full powers in each case and, consequently, are also authorized to
formulate reservations.43
Naturally, the Secretary-General's approach has been influenced by the
large number of multilateral treaties deposited with him, the numerous states
which may be eligible to undertake treaty actions with regard to these treaties,
the need to safeguard those states' interests, and the political sensitivities
surrounding his decisions. He is also aware of the necessity to protect his own
4 See VCLT, supra note 5, art. 7, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 334; 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 211, U.N.
Doc. ST[LEG/SER.C/14; SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 1 101, 104-107, 110.
" See VCLT, supra note 5, art. 7, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 334. The Council of Europe and the
Organization of American States permit reservations to be formulated in letters from permanent
representatives to these organizations. See Alain Pellet, Sixth Report on Reservations to
Treaties, 64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/518/Add.1 (2001). The Special Rapporteur also appears to
favor such a flexible approach. Id. M 67-71.
42 See SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 102. "However, full powers may also be
"general", [sic] i.e. [sic] full powers that do not specify the treaty to be signed, but rather
authorize the representative to sign all treaties of a certain kind, most often all the treaties
adopted by an organization." Id.
43 See generally id.
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integrity. Accordingly, he has opted for a cautious approach which seeks to
ensure consistency between his practice and the requirements of the VCLT.
Accordingly, he requires the signature of an instrument containing a reserva-
tion by one of the recognized authorities or a person acting for the time being
in one of these positions (or a person carrying appropriate full powers)."
The Special Rapporteur, in his report, has favored an approach which
would permit the practice of each depositary to determine who could formulate
a reservation on behalf of his or her government with regard to treaties
deposited with that depositary.45 This approach may lend indirect weight to
the practice of the Secretary-General. 4
C. Form of Reservations
A reservation must be formulated in writing.47 As Dr. Frank Horn has
observed,
In the era of differentiated treaty making procedures it becomes
essential for reservations to be put down in writing in order to be
registered and notified by the depository, so that all interested
states become aware of them. A reservation not notified cannot
be acted upon. Other states would not be able to expressly accept
or object to such reservations.4"
4TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.4.
45 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifiy-Third Session, supra
note 31, at 444-45.
46 In accordance with recognized customary international treaty law, as codified
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, only heads of State, heads
of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs (referred to hereinafter as
"qualified authorities") are, by virtue of their functions, and without having
to produce full powers, considered as representing their State for the purpose
of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty, including their
signature with or without reservations....
SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 101.
47 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 23(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 338; 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B., supra note
40, at 211.
48 FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL
TREATIES 44 (1988).
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The Special Rapporteur, in his Sixth Report on Reservations to Treaties,
confirms that a reservation must be formulated in writing.
49
The Legal Counsel of the United Nations wrote in 1976:
A reservation must be formulated in writing, and both
reservations and withdrawals of reservations must emanate from
one of the three authorities (Head of State, Head of Government
or Minister for Foreign Affairs) competent to bind the State
internationally .... 50
A reservation is normally included in the instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession, or is annexed to the instrument.5 If
annexed to the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession,
in the practice of the Secretary-General, the reservation must be separately
signed by the head of state, head of government, minister for foreign affairs,
a person acting in the capacity of one of the above authorities, or a person
possessing full powers for that purpose. 2 Similarly, a modification to an
existing reservation must be formulated under the same conditions as a
reservation.53
mH. TIME FOR FORMULATING RESERVATIONS
Article 19 of the VCLT specifies that
[a] state may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or
acceding to a treaty, [make] a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do
not include the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under [the above two categories], the
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty.54
9 Pellet, supra note 41, at 7.
50 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B., supra note 40, at 211 (citations omitted).
51 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.4.
52 id.
"' See id. § 3.5.8.
14 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-37.
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Thus, Article 19 of the VCLT requires that a reservation be made at the time
of signature or when an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or
accession is deposited."
This approach ensures a degree of certainty in treaty relations as the
information on a reservation would be recorded and circulated to parties along
with the relevant treaty action. A reservation made upon simple signature (i.e.,
signature subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession) is merely
declaratory and must be formally confirmed in writing when the state
expresses its consent to be bound.56
Despite the requirements of Article 19 of the VCLT,57 the practice of the
Secretary-General has evolved to accommodate reservations formulated after
the relevant treaty actions had been undertaken.58 Accordingly, the Secretary-
General now permits a state to qualify its treaty obligations in the light of
changed circumstances and to formulate a reservation after the act of
ratification, accession, approval, or acceptance, but subject to certain
limitations." Where the Secretary-General, as depositary, receives a written
statement containing a reservation after the deposit of the instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, he circulates the reservation
to all the states parties unless the treaty prohibits reservations or permits only
certain specified reservations.6' These are referred to as late reservations.
However, the Secretary-General will accept such a reservation in deposit only
if no state party objects to it.61 This approach is based on the premise that any
act which results in the modification of a treaty obligation already undertaken
by a state party is valid only with the unanimous consent of all the other parties
to that treaty.61
5 A reservation can be made on succession to a treaty also. Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 20(2), 1946 U.N.T.S. at 13.
6 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 23(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 338; SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note
4, 1 209.
"' VCLT, supra note 5, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-37.
58 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.3; see also SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note
4, H 204-206.
'9 See id.
6 Initially this was not the Secretary-General's approach. He had taken the view that a
government which did not make a reservation at the time of expressing its consent to be bound,
was not entitled to make one later. 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B., supra note 40, at 221.
61 SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note 4,1 205; TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.3.
62 See 1984 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 183, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/22.
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Initially, the Secretary-General permitted state parties only ninety days
within which to lodge objections to a late reservation.63 Recently, however, a
number of states raised concerns about the inadequacy of the ninety-day period
to complete their internal consultations and finalize their national positions
with regard to late reservations, especially in view of the need to take account
of complicated issues of law and policy.' The difficulties arising from this
short time limit were further accentuated where it was necessary for a group
of states, twenty-five in the case of the European Union as it stands today, to
coordinate their positions.65 The possibility of a state party seeking to use the
ninety-day period to deposit a reservation unnoticed by the other states parties
also became a pertinent concern. Had such a reservation been properly
formulated at the time of signature or the deposit of the instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, it is likely that the twelve-
month period stipulated under Article 20(5) of the VCLT for objections to be
lodged would have provided other state parties a longer time period to consider
it and, if necessary, to formulate objections.
The Secretary-General also recognizes the possibility of an existing
reservation being substituted with a new reservation or being modified at a
subsequent date so as to create new exemptions from, or modifications to, the
legal effects of the provisions of a treaty.66 A modification of this kind has the
nature of a new reservation. The Secretary-General, as depositary, circulates
such substitutions or modifications. Also, in such cases the Secretary-General
allows the same time limit for objections to be lodged as he would permit in
the case of late reservations.67
The complexities associated with the practice of permitting only ninety
days for objections to be lodged to late reservations or to modifications to
existing reservations were illustrated by the modification formulated on
January 29, 1999, by the government of Maldives to its reservation made upon
accession to the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.68
6 See 1978 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 199, U.N. Doc. STJLEG/SER.C/16.
64 With the enlargement of the United Nations and the creation of more coherent regional
and economic groupings, this could increasingly become a significant issue.
65 Members of the European Union coordinate their positions on legal issues through regular
meetings.
66 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.3.
67 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, Annex 2.
68 The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with the
provisions of the Convention, except those which the Government may
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The Secretary-General, following the existing depositary practice, advised
the international community that he would receive the proposed modification
69
in deposit in the absence of any objection from a contracting state either to the
deposit itself or to the procedure envisaged. He also gave a period of ninety
days from the date of the notification for objections to be lodged." No
objection was received to the modification within the ninety days specified.7
Accordingly, the modification was accepted in deposit on June 23, 1999.72
In actual fact, it was known that a number of states had intended to object
formally to the modified reservation by Maldives, but were unable to lodge
their objections within the specified time. Since the objections were received
by the depositary after the stipulated time limit, they were characterized as
"communications" instead of "objections" which would have caused the
modification to fail. Germany was one of the states to lodged a late objection
consider contradictory to the principles of the Islamic Sharia upon which the
laws and traditions of the Maldives is founded.
Furthermore, the Republic of Maldives does not see itself bound by any
provisions of the Convention which obliges to change its Constitution and
laws in any manner.
Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 13th
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 6, at 19, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/1994/2 (1993), available at
http:f/www.bayefsky.com/general/cedaw-sp-19942.pdf; 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF
LEGALAFFAIRS, Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 4(8), n.43,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partllchapterIV/treatylO.asp#Notes
(last updated Apr. 19, 2005).
69 The modified reservation of the Republic of Maldives read:
1. The Government of the Republic of Maldives expresses its reservation to
article 7 (a) of the Convention, to the extent that the provision contained in
the said paragraph conflicts with the provision of article 34 of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Maldives.
2. The Government of the Republic of Maldives reserves its right to apply
article 16 of the Convention concerning the equality of men and women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations without prejudice to the
provisions of the Islamic Sharia, which govern all marital and family relations
of the 100 percent Muslim population of the Maldives.
1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OFLEGALAFFAIRS, Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 4(8), http:/funtreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/
partl/chapterlV/treatyO.asp (last updated Apr. 19, 2005).




GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
to Maldives' modified reservation.73 Germany's objection was lodged on
August 16, 1999.14 It is also interesting that Germany, despite being aware of
the Secretary-General's practice with regard to late or modified reservations,
sought to reaffirm, in its objection, its position under the VCLT by stating,
"reservations to treaties can only be made by a State when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty. 75
Those states which had failed to meet the ninety-day deadline then allowed
by the Secretary-General for objections to be lodged to late reservations or
modifications to existing reservations were not pleased with the outcome. In
73 id.
74 Id. The objection by Germany, which was characterized as a communication, reads as
follows:
The modification does not constitute a withdrawal or a partial withdrawal
of the original reservations to the Convention by the Republic of the
Maldives. Instead the modification constitutes a new reservation to article
7(a) (right of women to vote in all elections and public referenda and be
eligible for elections to all publicly elected bodies), and article 16 (elimina-
tion of discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations) of the Convention extending and reinforcing the original
reservations.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany notes that reserva-
tions to treaties can only be made by a State when signing, ratifying,
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty (article 19 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties). After a State has bound itself to a treaty
under international law it can no longer submit new reservations or extend or
add to old reservations. It is only possible to totally or partially withdraw
original reservations, something unfortunately not done by the Government
of the Republic of the Maldives with its modification.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany objects to the
modification of the reservations.
ld.
75 Id. Germany had previously taken a much softer approach to late reservations:
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has taken note of the
communication of the French Government on the Convention of 19 March
1931 providing a Uniform Law for Cheques, which was received by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations on 7 February 1979 and distributed
with circular note C.N.29.1979.Treaties-1 of 10 February 1979 of the Acting
Director of the General Legal Division and which informed about the
modification of France's membership of the Convention effected by the said
communication, and raises no objections thereto.
2 TREATY SEcriON, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Convention Providing a Uniform Law for
Cheques, in MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSrTED WtTH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, No. It, n.4,




this particular case, the problem was aggravated by the delayed transmission
of the depositary notification containing the modified reservation,7 6 which
made it difficult for the states concerned to consult each other on the
appropriate response. The objecting states, which were mainly from the
European Community, thus made representations to the Legal Counsel of the
United Nations on the inadequacy of the time period for objections to be
lodged to modifications of existing reservations or to late reservations.77
The need to rush to lodge objections within ninety days has also resulted in
unclear consequences. For example, the instrument lodged with the depositary
on February 6, 1998, by the government of Malaysia, stating Malaysia's
intention to modify its reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women upon accession, 78 may have caused
consequences which are still to be determined.
Malaysia's proposed modification read as follows:
With respect to article 5(a) of the Convention, the Govern-
ment of Malaysia declares that the provision is subject to the
Syariah law on the division of inherited property.
With respect to article 7(b) of the Convention, the Govern-
ment of Malaysia declares that the application of said article 7(b)
shall not affect appointment to certain public offices like the
Mufti Syariah Court Judges, and the Imam which is in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah law.
With respect to article 16.1(a) and paragraph 2, the Govern-
ment of Malaysia declares that under the Syariah law and the
laws of Malaysia the age limit for marriage for women is sixteen
and men is eighteen.79
76 At the time, due to organizational factors and technical limitations, depositary notifications
in paper form took weeks (sometimes months) to be distributed.
" The European Community's concerns were a major factor in the decision to extend the
period from ninety days to twelve months.
78 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OFLEGALAFFAIRS, Convention on the Elimination ofAll
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 4(8), n.42, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternet
bible/partlchapterlV/treatylO.asp#Notes (last updated Apr. 19, 2005).
79 Id.
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The Secretary-General, following the normal practice, proposed to receive
the modification in question for deposit in the absence of any objection on the
part of any of the contracting states, either to the deposit itself or to the
procedure envisaged, within a period of ninety days from the date of its
notification, April 21, 1998.80
The Secretary-General received a blanket objection from the government
of France within the specified time period relating to the modification
proposed by Malaysia.81 Accordingly the modification, including the aspects
which may have resulted in limiting the scope of the existing reservation, could
not be received in deposit.
82
On April 4, 2000, in a letter addressed to the Permanent Representatives to
the United Nations, the Legal Counsel advised that the time limit for objecting
to late reservations and modified reservations had been reviewed. 3 He
acknowledged the Secretary-General's understanding of the inadequacy of the
ninety-day period. 4 Accordingly, the Legal Counsel advised that the time
limit would be extended to twelve months from the date of the depositary
notification.8 ' This change in the practice of the Secretary-General, in addition
to providing states with more time to consider and formulate any objections to
late or modified reservations, also brings it into line with the time limit
available under Article 20(5) of the VCLT."6 Since depositary notifications are
also circulated by e-mail now, and the e-mails are transmitted immediately on
the finalization of depositary notifications, states do, in actual fact, receive
twelve months within which to formulate their objections.
The receipt of an objection to a late reservation or a modification to an
existing reservation within the specified time is critical. Where a late
reservation or a modification to an existing reservation has been circulated and
80 id.
S The objection lodged by France on July 20, 1998, reads as follows:
France considers that the reservation made by Malaysia, as expressed in the
partial withdrawal and modifications made by Malaysia on 6 February 1998,
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. France
therefore objects to the [reservation].
This objection shall not otherwise affect the entry into force of the
Convention between France and Malaysia.
Id.
82 Id.
83 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, Annex 2.
84 Id.
85 Id.
6 See VCLT, supra note 5, art. 20(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
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no objection has been received within the specified time limit, the Secretary-
General accepts the reservation in deposit. The acceptance of late reservations
by the Secretary-General could be said to introduce an element of uncertainty
into treaty relations, but it could also be argued that this practice accommo-
dates the inherent right of states to modify their treaty relations with the
consent of the other states parties to a treaty.
A different situation has arisen where some states have denounced treaties
to which they are party in order to accede afresh with reservations. This
approach has been adopted by a few countries to exclude or modify their
existing treaty obligations. The actions of these countries has not been
received favorably by the international community in general. For example,
the use of the Human Rights Committee to delay or thwart the process of
justice for Guyanese nationals under the penalty of death posed a major law
and order problem for the government of Guyana. The position of the
government of Guyana was further aggravated by domestic political pressure.
In response, Guyana denounced its accession to the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on January 5, 1999,
effective April 5, 1999;"7 Guyana re-acceded on April 5, 1999, with a
reservation which reads:
Guyana re-accedes to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a Reservation to
article 6 thereof with the result that the Human Rights Committee
shall not be competent to receive and consider communications
from any persons who is under sentence of death for the offences
of murder and treason in respect of any matter relating to his
prosecution, detention, trial, conviction, sentence or execution of
the death sentence and any matter connected therewith.88
8 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 4(5), n.2, http://untreaty.un.orgENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/
partl/chapterlV/treaty7.asp#Notes (last updated Apr. 19, 2005).
"' 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 4(5), http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHI/bible/englishinternetbible/
partlI/chapterlV/treaty7.asp (last updated Apr. 19, 2005).
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Guyana's re-accession with a reservation attracted a number of objections.89
Although Guyana appears to have stayed close to the letter of the law to deal
with a difficult domestic policy problem, objecting states have questioned the
propriety of the procedure employed by Guyana.9
Similarly, the government of Trinidad and Tobago acceded to the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on
November 14, 1980.91 Confronted by a similar problem to Guyana's, on May
26, 1998, the government of Trinidad and Tobago informed the Secretary-
General of its decision to denounce the Optional Protocol effective August 26,
1998.92 On August 26, 1998, the government of Trinidad and Tobago re-
acceded to the Optional Protocol with a reservation to Article 1.93 However,
19 See 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRs, supra note 87. Sweden's
objection, lodged on April 27, 2000, reads as follows:
The Government of Sweden has examined the reservation to article 1 made
by the Government of Guyana at the time of its re-accession to the Optional
Protocol. The Government of Sweden notes that the Government of Guyana
accepts the principle that States cannot use the Optional Protocol as a vehicle
to enter reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights itself, and that it stresses that its reservation in no way detracts from
its obligations and engagements under the Covenant.
Nevertheless, the Government of Sweden has serious doubts as to the
propriety of the procedure followed by the Government of Guyana. While
article 12, paragraph 1 of the Protocol provides that any State Party may
denounce the Protocol "at any time," the denunciation may in no case be used
by a State Party for the sole purpose of formulating reservations to that
instrument after having re-acceded to it. Such a practice would constitute a
misuse of the procedure and would be manifestly contrary to the principle of
good faith. It further contravenes the rule of pacta sunt servanda. As such,
it undermines the basis of international treaty law and the protection of human
rights. The Government of Sweden therefore wishes to declare its grave
concern over this method of proceeding.
Furthermore, the reservation seeks to limit the international obligations of
Guyana towards individuals under sentence of death. The Government of
Sweden is of the view that the right to life is fundamental and that the death
penalty cannot be accepted. It is therefore of utmost importance that states






93 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAiMRs, supra note 88.
Trinidad and Tobago re-accedes to the Optional Protocol to the International
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since the Human Rights Committee sought to ignore the reservation which
Trinidad and Tobago had lodged,94 the government of Trinidad and Tobago
notified the Secretary-General on March 27, 2000, that it had decided to
denounce the Optional Protocol for the second time with effect from June 27,
2000.9'
The reservation lodged by Trinidad and Tobago on re-accession has also
been the subject of objections from a number of governments which raised
serious doubts about the propriety of the procedure followed and the impact
of such subsequent reservations on treaty-based human rights regimes. These
governments have considered the denunciation of the Optional Protocol
succeeded by re-accession with a reservation to undermine the basis of
international treaty law as well as the international protection of human
rights.96
IV. INFORMING PARTIES OF RESERVATIONS
A. Where a Treaty Prohibits Reservations
Many treaties specifically prohibit reservations. For example, no
reservation or exception may be made to the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, except
where expressly permitted elsewhere in the agreement.97 Similarly, Article
120 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court prohibits
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a Reservation to article I thereof
to the effect that the Human Rights Committee shall not be competent to
receive and consider communications relating to any prisoner who is under
sentence of death in respect of any matter relating to his prosecution, his
detention, his trial, his conviction, his sentence or the carrying out of the
death sentence on him and any matter connected therewith.
Id.
94 Decision of the Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 67th
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/671D/84511999 (1999).
9' This raises the question of the role of human rights bodies in determining the validity of
reservations lodged by parties to a human rights treaty.
96 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICEOFLEGALAFFAIRs, supra note 87, n.3 (providing Italy's
objections to the actions of Trinidad and Tobago).
" Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 2(2), 33 I.L.M. 1309, 1313 (incorporating Article 309 of the Convention
which excludes reservations and declarations unless expressly permitted); TREATY HANDBOOK,
supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
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reservations.98 In cases where a treaty expressly prohibits reservations and a
state on expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty formulates a
statement, however phrased, which is unambiguously a reservation, the
Secretary-General as depositary makes a preliminary assessment as to whether
that statement constitutes a reservation.99 The essential criterion employed is
whether the statement in question results in the modification or exclusion of
the legal rights and obligations being undertaken under the treaty by the state
in question. If it is determined that the statement has no bearing on the state's
legal rights and obligations, the Secretary-General circulates the statement to
the other states concerned.'0 However, if the statement is in fact a
reservation,"0 ' the Secretary-General will refuse to accept that state's signature,
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession in conjunction with the
offending statement. 0 2 In these circumstances, the Secretary-General will also
draw the attention of the state concerned to the issue while withholding
circulation of the unauthorised reservation.10 3
"Where a prima facie determination by the Secretary-General is not
possible, and doubts remain, the Secretary-General may request a clarification
from the declarant on the real nature of the statement."'" If the declarant
formally confirms that the statement is not intended to be a reservation but
only a declaration, the Secretary-General will formally receive the instrument
in deposit and notify all states concerned accordingly.0 5 Such a clarification,
whether embodied in the statement in question or submitted separately, may
have the effect of estopping the state concerned from relying on the statement
to exclude or limit its rights and obligations under the treaty.
Situations of this nature have arisen with regard to a number of treaty
actions undertaken by states in recent times. It is suggested that the Secretary-
98 "No reservations may be made to this Statute." Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, art. 120, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 155. Article 120 has
given rise to a numberof issues in view of the ambiguous nature of certain declarations that have
been formulated by states on ratification.
99 SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note 4, 194; TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
100 Id.
"'1 See VCLT, supra note 5, art. 2(l)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333 (providing a definition of
"reservation").
102 SUMMARY OFPRAcTICE, supra note 4, 193; TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
"0 SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 1 191; TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
104 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5; see also SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note
4, 195:




General's approach with regard to treaties that prohibit reservations may be
justified on the basis that the depositary is required to be guided by the
provisions of the treaty deposited with him.1"l Accordingly, he is at liberty not
to accept in deposit a statement that is prohibited by the treaty, i.e., a
reservation. There have been rare occasions when the depositary, guided by
the provisions of a treaty, has refused to accept an offending reservation in
deposit.1"7 It is not uncommon for informal discussions to take place between
the depositary and the state concerned with a view to modifying the language
of a statement which creates doubts as to its nature. When this has occurred
(on occasion, such discussions have been prolonged and difficult), it has been
the experience of the Secretary-General that the problematic statement is
withdrawn or appropriately modified by the state concerned.
The role of the Secretary-General as depositary in relation to problematic
statements is illustrated by the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court submitted by Australia in 2002 to which a
declaration was attached. Australia clarified its position by making itclear that
its statement was only intended to be a declaration.'0 8 The first paragraph of
Australia's declaration emphasizes that it is not a reservation. It is suggested
that a confirmation of intent of this nature will estop the state making it from
relying on it as a reservation.
106 AUST, supra note 1, at 128.
101 Since these situations are the subject of informal discussions only, the Secretary-General
does not normally keep records of them.
109 The Government of Australia, having considered the Statute, now hereby
ratifies the same, for and on behalf of Australia, with the following declara-
tion, the terms of which have full effect in Australian law, and which is not
a reservation:
Australia notes that a case will be inadmissible before the International
Criminal Court (the Court) where it is being investigated or prosecuted by a
State. Australia reaffirms the primacy of its criminal jurisdiction in relation
to crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. To enable Australia to exercise
its jurisdiction effectively, and fully adhering to its obligations under the
Statute of the Court, no person will be surrendered to the Court by Australia
until it has had the full opportunity to investigate or prosecute any alleged
crimes.
1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OFLEGAL AFFAIRS, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 18(10),
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHWbible/englishintemetbiblelpartl/chapterXVIII/treaty lO.asp (last
updated Apr. 19, 2005).
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The Secretary-General, as depositary, is not required to request such a
clarification automatically with regard to a doubtful statement." 9 Where a
"declaration" formulated by a state continues to cause doubt about its meaning
and where the clarification provided by the state concerned does not assist in
making the situation clearer, the Secretary-General will circulate such
"declaration" and leave it to the states concerned to formulate their own
positions."' "[i1t is for the States concerned to raise any objections they may
have to statements they consider to be unauthorized reservations."'
B. Where a Treaty Authorizes Reservations
Some treaties specifically authorize certain types of reservations. Where
a state formulates a reservation to a treaty that is expressly authorized by it,
"the Secretary-General, as depositary, informs the States concerned [of such
reservation] by depositary notification."" 2 Unless a translation" 3 or an in-
depth analysis is required, such a reservation is processed and transmitted by
e-mail to the states concerned on the date of deposit." 4  A depositary
notification in paper format will follow, and such notification is also placed on
the Internet. "A reservation of this nature does not require any subsequent
acceptance by the states concerned, unless the treaty so provides .... 115
C. Where a Treaty Is Silent on Reservations
Where a treaty is silent on reservations and a state formulates a reservation,
the Secretary-General, as depositary, informs the states concerned of the
reservation by depositary notification." 6 This has given rise to contentious
issues, including whether the statement in question is compatible with the
109 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
l1o Id. § 3.6.5.
.. Id. § 3.5.5.
112 Id.
113 Reservations submitted in certain languages may take some time to circulate due to
difficulties with translations. Obtaining translations on time remains a major problem for the
Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Secretariat
encourages states to submit courtesy translations, in English and in French, of their reservations
and declarations.
114 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
"5 Id. (directing readers to Article 20(1) of the VCLT); VCLT, supra note 5, art. 20(1), 1155
U.N.T.S. at 337.
116 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
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object and purpose of the treaty."' Guided by the advisory opinion of the ICJ
relating to reservations to the Genocide Convention, and the General Assembly
resolutions that followed,"' the approach of the Secretary-General is to accept
such statements in deposit and let the state parties draw their own legal
conclusions."' Generally, human rights treaties do not contain provisions
relating to reservations 2° and it is with regard to these treaties that this issue
of whether a reservation lodged is compatible with the object and purpose of
a treaty has arisen most frequently. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women have attracted a large number of reservations as well as a
similar number of objections to reservations.' 2 '
117 For example, see the U.N. Human Rights Committee's Addendum to the General
Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the
Internal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 24(52), General
Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the
Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41
of the Covenant: 'The absence of a prohibition on reservations does not mean that any
reservation is permitted." U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1282d mtg. at 2, U.N.
Doe. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 24(52)].
"' See supra text accompanying notes 15-21. For additional discussion, see ROSENNE, supra
note 2, at 374; see also AUST, supra note 1, at 129.
119 See SHADTAi ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945-1986, at 435
(1989).
120 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.5.
121 See generally I TREATYSECTION, U.N. OFFICEOFLEGALAFFAIRS, International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL, ch. 4(4), http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterIV/
treaty6.asp (last updated Apr. 19, 2005); 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES
DEPosrrED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ch. 4(3), http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty5.asp (last updated Apr. 19, 2005); 1 TREATY
SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 69.
'The practice of formulating reservations to multilateral human rights treaties emerged
after the adoption of the first human rights treaty in the United Nations system, the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in 1948." William A. Schabas,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79, 80
(1997).
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V. WHO DETERMINES THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A RESERVATION?
The question has often arisen as to who possesses the authority to
determine whether a reservation formulated by a state or an international
organization is compatible with the object and purpose of a treaty. As
discussed above, where a treaty prohibits reservations and a statement which
is unambiguously a reservation is submitted to the Secretary-General, his
practice as depositary is to refuse to accept such a statement in deposit.
122
However, where a treaty is silent on reservations and a statement which is
tantamount to a reservation is submitted to the Secretary-General, he circulates
such a statement, even though it might be contrary to the object and purpose
of the treaty, and leaves it to the states concerned to determine their own legal
positions. 123
The Secretary-General takes the view that the function of determining
whether a statement made by a government upon signature, ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession meets the technical criteria for acceptance
in deposit as a reservation falls within his depositary responsibilities,
particularly where the treaty concerned contains specific and applicable
provisions. 24 It is suggested that this approach is compatible with rules of
customary international law as codified in the VCLT and the long-standing
practice of the Secretary-General.
Where the treaty itself is silent on reservations, the Secretary-General does
not undertake the additional responsibility of determining whether a proposed
reservation is compatible with its object and purpose. The Secretary-General's
position must be viewed against the background of the ongoing debate on the
role of the committees established under the various human rights treaties in
determining the acceptability of reservations formulated for these treaties.
25
It has been argued that the general reservations regime in international law is
largely based on the idea of reciprocity between state parties-a concept which
is difficult to transpose to various fields, including human rights. Treaty
provisions in the human rights field establish rules of conduct for all states;
thus treaties concluded in the field of human rights do not "lend themselves to
122 See discussion infra Part IVA.
123 SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 178.
124 Id. (H 165, 194-196.
125 These treaty bodies have called on states to withdraw reservations and, in several cases,
have plainly declared that certain reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty in question. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations and State
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (2002).
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the formulation of reservations," as allowing states to object to certain treaty
provisions would contradict the treaty's raison d'tre.126 The Committee on
the Rights of the Child regularly challenges reservations lodged in deposit by
state parties which are considered to be contrary to the object and purpose of
the convention. 27  Frequently, the Committee demands that state parties
withdraw their reservations "in the spirit of the World Conference on Human
Rights" even when it does not suggest that the reservations actually violate the
object and purpose of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 128
The Human Rights Committee, established under Article 28 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 129 has taken a similar
view in asserting the right to determine the legality of reservations and even
their scope. The Committee has stated that "[t]he normal consequence of an
unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for
a reserving party."' 3° Furthermore the Committee has asserted that "such a
reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be
operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation."'' 3'
126 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION REPORT, 1996,
118 (1996), http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reportsI1996/contents.htm (providing a summary of
Professor Alain Pellet comments made while presenting to the ILC his second report to the
Commission on the topic of "The law and practice relating to reservations to treaties"). In its
General Comment No. 24(52), the Human Rights Committee considered that
[i]t necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant. This
is in part because ... it is an inappropriate task for States parties in relation
to human rights treaties, and in part because it is a task that the Committee
cannot avoid in the performance of its functions.
General Comment No. 24(52), supra note 117, at 7.
127 See, e.g., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the
Convention, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Morocco,
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 13th Sess., addendum 60, at 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.60
(1996).
12 See Summary Record ofthe 179th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child,
7th Sess., 179th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR. 179 (1994) (discussing Argentina).
129 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 28, 999 U.N.T.S.
171,179.
130 General Comment 24(52), supra note 117, at 7.
131 id. But see Alain Pellet, Seventh Report on Reservations to Treaties, addendum 2, at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/526/Add.2 (2002) (containing a draft guideline formulated by the Special
Rapporteur: "The fact that a reservation is found impermissible by a body monitoring the
implementation of the treaty to which the reservation relates does not constitute the withdrawal
of that reservation.").
20051
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have not agreed with
the Human Rights Committee on this point. For example, the United States
"could not accept the Human Rights Committee's views in its General
Comment No. 24(52), since it did not believe that the classic rules on
reservations were inadequate for human rights treaties."' 32 The United States'
position was that the Committee's assertion regarding the severability of
reservations "had no basis in international law."'133 Further, the U.S. legal
advisor expressed doubt as to how many legal advisors would recommend that
their governments ratify a treaty if the governments were aware that their
reservations would be ignored and that they would still be bound by the terms
of the treaty.
13 1
It is recalled that the decision of the committee established under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
to disregard the reservation deposited by Trinidad and Tobago on its re-
accession to the Optional Protocol, resulted in Trinidad and Tobago denounc-
ing the Optional Protocol.
135
There appear to be two distinct issues to be considered. One relates to the
acceptance in deposit by the depositary of a statement which is a reservation
where the treaty is silent on reservations, and which may also be contrary to
its object and purpose. In this case, it is clearly the responsibility of the
depositary to determine whether it should be accepted in deposit consistent
with the law and his practice. The Secretary-General will accept such a
statement in deposit if it meets the technical requirements relating to
reservations and will circulate it to the other state parties. The other issue is
determining whether such a statement is capable of affecting the legal relations
established under the treaty. Clearly on this issue there is a divergence of
views, with some states asserting that it is for states alone to determine such
legal effect.
The Special Rapporteur has flagged a related issue, particularly in view of
the lack of resources which restrict the ability of smaller states to become
aware of the nature of a reservation circulated by the depositary. Many
questionable statements may escape their attention simply because of their lack
132 Summary Record of the 13th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 50th Sess., at 12, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/50/SR. 13 (1995) (providing a summary of the comments of Mr. Conrad Harper,
Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
133 id.
13 Id. at 13.
135 Decision of the Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 94.
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of resources to analyze all of these statements adequately. Professor Alain
Pellet has suggested that the reservations regime under the VCLT was intended
to apply universally, including human rights treaties. However, as his Second
Report states, "the establishment, by most of these treaties, of monitoring
bodies influences the modalities of determination of the permissibility of
reservations."' 36 In these circumstances, the view has been expressed that
there is a role for the depositary to draw the attention of the international
community to statements of a questionable nature.137 A range of divergent
views have been expressed by delegates to the Sixth Committee on this
issue.
138
It is suggested that there is a way to reconcile these seemingly disparate
positions. Undoubtedly, it is the depositary who should determine which
statements are to be received in deposit and circulated consistent with the law
and his practice. The relevant human rights bodies could perform the role of
examining and expressing a view on whether such a statement is compatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty in question. Given the twelve-month
136 Alain Pellet, Second Report on Reservations to Treaties, addendum 1, at 86, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/477/Add. 1 (1996).
"' See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Fourth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002) (providing the
text of § 2.1.17 (Functions of depositaries) in the set of draft guidelines on reservations to
treaties). New Zealand observed:
In New Zealand's view, the dialogue between the reserving party and the
depositary is likely to be a useful process for all concerned, and would be
carried out on both sides with sensitivity. We envisage that this process
would in most cases resolve the issue. We would also note that the depositary
already has a similar function in relation to the due and proper form of a
reservation, on which it is able to make a judgement under Article 2.1.7. In
addition, many foreign ministries (particularly small foreign ministries) would
not have the resources to check each reservation they receive notification of
for impermissibility. The high volume of treaty notifications that a State
receives means that in practice these are not likely to be checked at senior
levels, but if the depositary were to circulate a note which referred to the
discussion it had with the reserving State about "manifest impermissibility,"
it would draw the attention of the parties to that particular notification and the
possible need to take a view on the reservation involved.
Statement by New Zealand's U.N. Representative, Rebecca Jonassen, to the U.N. General
Assembly, 57th Session, 6th Committee (Oct. 31, 2002), at http://www.mfat.govt/nz/speech/
pastspeeches/speeches2002/31oct02.html.
138 Some states have suggested that the depositary should refuse to communicate a reservation
that was manifestly impermissible. See Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of lts Fifty-Fourth Session, supra note 137, at 113.
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period specified in Article 20(5) of the VCLT, 139 and in the case of late
reservations, this task will need to be performed expeditiously. Finally, or in
parallel, it will be for the state parties to determine whether they would object
to such a statement being accepted in deposit.
VI. TIME FOR FORMULATING OBJECTIONS TO RESERVATIONS
Where a treaty is silent on reservations and a reservation is formulated and
subsequently circulated, the states concerned have twelve months to object to
the reservation, beginning on the date of the depositary notification or the date
on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is
later. 140
However, as discussed above,1 4 ' some states have tended to submit
objections even after the twelve-month period has elapsed. In the past this may
have resulted from the late receipt of the relevant depositary notification or
might even have been the result of a conscious decision by the state concerned
in order to avoid producing any legal consequence from its objection. Where
a state submits an objection to the Secretary-General after the end of the
twelve-month period, the Secretary-General circulates such objection simply
as a "communication."' 142
The legal effect of a reservation that has attracted a late objection which has
been circulated by the depositary as a "communication" still awaits judicial
analysis. Article 20(5) of the VCLT specifies a clear time limit for objections
to be lodged. 143 It may be suggested that where a time limit has been specified
for objections to reservations by treaty or by customary international law (or
in the case of late reservations, in the depositary notification advising the
parties of the proposed reservation), non-compliance with such time limit is
tantamount to implicit acceptance of the reservation by a non-objecting state.
139 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 20(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
140 TREATYHANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.6; VCLT, supra note 5, art. 20(b), 1155 U.N.T.S.
at 337.
141 See supra Part 111.
142 SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note 4, § 213; TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.6.
Late objections, not having a legal effect, are not registered by the depositary pursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations and they are not published in the United Nations Treaty
Series. The circulation of such late objections may assist in highlighting the concerns of the
objecting state with regard to the reservation in question.
"' VCLT, supra note 5, art. 20(5), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337. Aust suggests that the time limit
specified in Article 20(5) is not part of customary international law. AUST, supra note 1, at 127.
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Furthermore, a clear objective of VCLT Article 20(5) is to ensure certainty in
treaty relations. Late objections do not contribute to achieving this objective.
In the circumstances, it is suggested that late objections should not have a legal
consequence but only a moral or political effect. The practice of the Secretary-
General with regard to the continued circulation of late objections may also
reflect the circumstances of a time when depositary notifications containing
reservations (and late reservations) generally took a long time to be finalized
and sent to capitals.
The Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary, has taken the view
that it is for the parties concerned to determine the legal consequences, if any,
of a late objection."
A. Late Objections to Late Reservations or Modifications to Reservations
Where no objection to a late reservation or a modification to an existing
reservation has been received within the period of twelve months specified, the
Secretary-General accepts the reservation or modification in deposit. In these
cases the receipt of an objection in time is critical. 145
B. Effect of an Objection on Entry into Force of a Treaty
An objection to a reservation "does not preclude the entry into force of the
treaty as between the objecting and reserving States unless a contrary intention
is definitely expressed by the objecting State."' 46  "Normally, to avoid
uncertainty, an objecting State specifies whether its objection to the reserva-
tion precludes the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving
State."' 47 The Secretary-General, as depositary, circulates such objections. 4 '
See, for example, the objection by Denmark on August 16, 2001, to a
'" The acceptance of late objections and their circulation by the Secretary-General may
reflect the fact that in the past reservations were not always circulated in time for other states to
respond to them within the stipulated time. See generally SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note
4, 213.
45 See discussion infra Part HI. The Secretary-General circulates late objections to late
reservations or to modifications to existing reservations as "communications." The reasons for
this practice have given rise to questions. See generally Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, supra note 28, at 213.
146 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 20(4)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
7 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.6.
148 Id.; see SUMMARY OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, 214.
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reservation made by Saudi Arabia upon its accession to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
The Government of Denmark has examined the reservations
made by the Government of Saudi Arabia upon ratification on the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women as to any interpretation of the provisions of the
Convention that is incompatible with the norms of Islamic law.
The Government of Denmark finds that the general reserva-
tion with reference to the provisions of Islamic law are of
unlimited scope and undefined character. Consequently, the
Government of Denmark considers the said reservations as being
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention and
accordingly inadmissible and without effect under international
law.
The Government of Denmark therefore objects to the afore-
said reservations made by the Government of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women.
These objections shall not preclude the entry into force of the
Convention in its entirety between Saudi Arabia and Denmark.
The Government of Denmark recommends the Government of
Saudi Arabia to reconsider its reservations to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women.'49
"If a State does not object to a reservation made by another State, the first
State is deemed to have tacitly accepted the reservation,"' and the treaty
applies as modified by the reservation as between those states.' 5'
149 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, supra note 69; see also TREATY
HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.6.
150 Id.
... See VCLT, supra note 5, art. 21(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337. But see General Comment
24(52), supra note 117, at 17: "And because the operation of the classic rules on reservations
is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have often not seen any legal interest in or need to
object to reservations." Id. This idea may not necessarily be endorsed by many states.
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C. Withdrawal of Reservations
"A State may, unless the treaty provides otherwise, withdraw its reservation
or objection to a reservation completely or partially at any time."' 52 Also, "[i]n
such a case, the consent of the states concerned is not necessary for the validity
of the withdrawal."' 53 In the practice of the Secretary-General, the withdrawal
must be formulated in writing and signed by the head of state, head of
government minister for foreign affairs, a person acting for the time-being for
one of the above authorities, or a person having full powers for that purpose
issued by one of the above authorities.'54 "The Secretary-General as
depositary, circulates a notification of withdrawal to all states
concerned....,,155
Article 22(3)(a) of the VCLT provides that "[t]he withdrawal of a
reservation becomes operative in relation to another contracting state only
when notice of it has been received by that state."' 1s Similarly, "[t]he
withdrawal of an objection to a reservation becomes operative when the notice
of it has been received by the State which formulated the reservation." '157
Since depositary notifications are circulated by the Secretary-General by e-
mail and are posted on the Internet immediately after being processed, it could
be assumed that such notifications are received by the interested states without
delay. They continue to be circulated in paper format.
VII. TERRITORIAL EXCLUSIONS
A unilateral statement made upon signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval, confirmation of, or accession to a treaty which purports to exclude
the application of a treaty provision to any part of the territory of the declarant
state would normally be considered a reservation. 58 Under the VCLT, a state
152 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.7. Reservations are withdrawn more frequently
today than in the past. See Pellet, supra note 131, at 2.
153 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.7; see VCLT, supra note 5, arts. 22-23, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 338.
'5' TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.7; see 1974 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 190-191, U.N. Doc.
A/5687; SUMMARY OFPRACTICE, supra note 4, 1 216. The Council of Europe appears to follow
a different practice. See Pellet, supra note 131, at 23.
'5 TREATY HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 3.5.7.
'5 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 22(3)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 338.
'.7 Id. art. 22(3)(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 338.
15' See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fiftieth Session, U.N.
GAOR 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (1998).
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is deemed to become party to a treaty on behalf of all its territories unless a
different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established.
59
However, in the practice of the Secretary-General, some statements made at
the relevant time, which seek to exclude certain parts of a state's territory from
the application of the treaty and which are not specifically authorized by the
treaty concerned, are not considered to be reservations. 160
The states which tend to exclude the application of a treaty to parts of their
territories in this manner, mainly from their non-metropolitan territories, are
the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark, and New Zealand.' 6' The
approach of these states is often explained on the basis of a domestic legal
need to consult these non-metropolitan territories or to take specific measures
through the legislatures of the territories prior to making a treaty applicable to
them. 62 Sometimes, it is not always possible to complete such consultations
or obtain the necessary legislative approvals in time for the state concerned to
undertake the relevant treaty action, particularly where there is international
pressure to become party to the treaty as soon as possible. These states have
relied on the view, which the Secretary-General acknowledges, that the act of
not extending the application of a treaty to such non-metropolitan territories
is compatible with the terms of Article 29 of the VCLT in that a treaty is
' Article 29 of the VCLT states, "Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is
otherwise established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory."
VCLT, supra note 5, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339. Some treaties provide in their own
provisions for parts of the territory of a party to be excluded from their application. Similarly,
the federal clause that used to be employed in treaties dealing with commercial and trade matters
permitted subunits of a state to be excluded from the application of a treaty. See SUMMARY OF
PRACTICE, supra note 4, 272.
160 They are simply recorded as territorial exclusions. See generally SUMMARY OFPRACTICE,
supra note 4, H 273-285.
161 For example, the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by
New Zealand contained the following statement:
[C] onsistent with the constitutional status of Tokelau and taking into account
its commitment to the development of self-government through an act of self-
determination under the Charter of the United Nations, this ratification shall
not extend to Tokelau unless and until a Declaration to this effect is lodged
by the Government of New Zealand with the Depositary on the basis of
appropriate consultation with that territory.
1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OFLEGAL AFFAIRS, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, in MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSITED WITHTHE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 18(10), n.5,
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/biblelenglishinternetbible/partllchapterXVIl/treatyl0.asp (last
updated Apr. 19, 2005).
162 See AUST, supra note 1, at 166-67.
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binding on the entirety of the territory of a state unless a different intention
appears from the treaty or "is otherwise established." 1 3 The Secretary-General
recognizes that in view of the continued practice of these states and the
acquiescence of other states in this practice, these statements of territorial
application should not be considered to be reservations.'" They are treated as
cases where a different intention had been established consistent with Article
29 of the VCLT. 65 In many instances, the states concerned have extended the
application of the treaty to the affected territories at a subsequent date once the
necessary domestic formalities have been completed and the depositary
acknowledges such extensions.'" The statements which exclude the territories
from the application of the treaty and any subsequent statements which extend
such application to them are both circulated to concerned states by the
Secretary-General without comment.
167
The Special Rapporteur in his Third Report suggests that this practice
should belong to the category of reservations.1
68
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is evident from the above discussion that over the years, the practice of
the Secretary-General as depositary of multilateral treaties has given rise to
important developments in the law and practice relating to reservations and
163 VCLT, supra note 5, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
6 AUST, supra note 1, at 167.
"'s 'Today, as in the past, many territories are small (some very small), but most have internal
self-government. Given their circumstances, they do not necessarily want, or need, every
multilateral treaty to apply to them." Id. at 168.
166 See id. at 167.
167 In an interesting development from the perspective of the Secretary-General, the United
Kingdom ratified the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 2001, but only on
behalf of its overseas territories. 1 TREATY SECTION, U.N. OFFICE OFLEGALAFFAIRS, Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 21(7), n.5, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternet
bible/partllchapterXXl/treaty9.asp#N5 (last updated Apr. 19,2005). Subsequently, in 2003, the
United Kingdom ratified the Agreement on behalf of its metropolitan territory. Id.
6 Alain Pellet, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties, addendum 3, at 18, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/491/Add.3 (1998); Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fiftieth Session, supra note 158, at 167, 182-83, 195, 206-09.
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declarations. Many such developments have been a response to the evolving
needs of an international community that has expanded considerably since the
establishment of the United Nations and the complexities of the wide range of
multilateral treaties deposited with him. In many instances these developments
have been explicitly endorsed by the international community or, at least, have
received its acquiescence such as in the case of late reservations. In this
respect, the quiet and non-obtrusive role played by the Secretary-General over
the previous sixty years in his capacity as depositary in contributing to the
development of the law and practice in this area has been very important.
However, as the above discussion further illustrates, some of these
developments, especially in the area of determining the compatibility of
reservations with the object and purpose of a treaty where the treaty is silent
on reservations, continue to give rise to debate in the international community.
This debate becomes all the more pertinent in view of the limitations
confronting many of the smaller states which lack the resources to critically
analyze all the reservations and declarations circulated by the depositary.'6 9
Many states continue to regard any infringement by a non-state entity of their
sovereign right to determine the scope of treaty relations as unacceptable.
As the law and practice in this area evolves, many factors, such as the
continuing importance attached to national sovereignty by states, the rapidly
changing needs of the international community, the critical new issues being
highlighted by modern multilateral treaties, the increasing emphasis being
placed on the rights of non-state actors such as individuals under international
law, and the need for legal certainty, will all continue to influence further
developments. In these circumstances, the work being done by the ILC to
clarify some of these issues by encouraging further discussion and to find
common ground will serve an invaluable purpose.
169 See AUST, supra note 1, at 100.
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